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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5589

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2563

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: REVISED DRAFT OF WG PAPER ON AERIAL INSPECTION

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: USNATO 1866

1. AT ITS MAY 7 MEETING, WG RETURNED TO DRAFT AERIAL INSPECTION PAPER (AC/276-WP(74)9)POUCHED)), AND HEARD FRG REP MAKE VARIETY OF POINTS, PRINCIPAL ONES BEING:

A. ONLY SUITABLE AIRCRAFT ARE THOSE HAVING PROLONGED FLIGHT CAPABILITY AT LOW SPEEDS AND DEDIUUM ALTITUDES;

B. ALL-WEATHER SENSORS SHOULD BE USED IN ADDITION TO OPTICAL SENSORS;

C. FREQUENCY AND ROUTING PATTERNS SHOULD NOT BE FIXED FAR IN ADVANCE OF ACTUAL INSPECTION FLIGHTS;

D. FRG RESERVES ON ITS POSITION AS TO WHEREHER
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AIRCRAFT SHOULD BELONG TO COUNTRY SHOSE FORCES ARE BEING INSPECTED;

E. A HOST XOUNTRY OBSERVER SHOULD BE ON BOARD AIRCRAFT;

F. AERIAL INSPECTION PROBLEMS CAN ONLY BE FINALLY WORKED

OUT AFTER A CONCRETE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED;
G. WG FINDINGS MUST BE SUBJECT TO POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY.

2. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, BONN'S INCREASINGLY EVIDENT DESIRE TO MAINTAIN COMPLETE FLEXIBILITY ON ALL ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION BECAME APPARENT IN AERIAL INSPECTION CONTEXT. DISCUSSION ALSO FOCUSED ON BASIC QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP OF AIRCRAFT, IDENTIFIED AT LAST MEETING (SEE REFTEL). SINCE THERE WERE NO INSTRUCTED POSITIONS ON QUESTION (OTHER THAN FRGS RESERVATION NOTED ABOVE AND SHAPES KNOWN AND REITERATED PREFERENCE FOR ADVERSARY INSPECTION), US REP SUGGESTED THAT CAPITALS COULD FOCUS ON PROBLEM MORE EASILY IF TEXT IDENTIFIED SPECIFIC OPTIONS.

3. STAFF GROUP HAS NOW CIRCULATED REVISED DRAFT INCORPORATING FRG IDEAS AND SETTING FORTH OPTIONS. ANNEXES TO PREVIOUS DRAFT HAVE NOT BEEN CHANGED IN NEW TEXT ALTHOUGH STAFF GROUP POINTS OUT IN COVER NOTE THAT ANNEX D WILL REQUIRE REDRAFTING IN LIGHT OF FURTHER DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN ON PAPER. WG RETURNS TO SUBJECT, WEDNESDAY, MAY 15, FOR WHICH MEETING WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REACTIONS IF POSSIBLE. SHOULD WASHINGTON AGREE WITH TEXTS CONCLUSION THAT OPTION 3 (INVOLVING ADVERSARY INSPECTION, AND THUS GENERALLY IN ACCORD WITH US APPROACH IN OCTOBER 5 VERIFICATION PAPER) IS PREFERRED SOLUTION, WE WILL THEN NEED GUIDANCE ON HOW LANGUAGE IN PARA 31 OF SPC'S VERIFICATION PAPER SHOULD BE MODIFIED. AS WASHINGTON WILL RECALL, CURRENT TEXT PROVIDES FOR INSPECTORS FLYING ABOARD HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT. COMMENT: WE ARE SENDING SEPTEL FIFTH REVISED DRAFT OF THIS PAPER, WHICH NOW INCLUDES GERMAN AMENDMENTS TRANSMITTED USNATO 2477. END COMMENT

4. TEXT OF REVISED AERIAL INSPECTION PAPER FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

BACKGROUND

1. THE SPC ON 14 JANUARY 1974 ASKED (AC/119-R(74)4) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO STUDY FURTHER THE MATTER OMANNED AIR-
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BORNE INSPECTION.

2. AERIAL INSPECTION HAS ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED IN PREVIOUS STUDIES. THESE INCLUDE:
SUB PARA A. REPORT OF THE VERIFICATION SUB-GROUP (AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED) WHICH STATES THAT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE COULD BE A VALUABLE ADJUNCT TO OTHER METHODS (OF VERIFICATION).
SUB PARA B. US REPORT ON VERIFICATION OF 5 OCTOBER 1973.
A SUMMARY OF THE SECTION DEALING WITH AERIAL INSPECTION IS AT ANNEX A TO THIS PAPER. THIS US REPORT GIVES THE MOST TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT.
SUB PARA C. THE ACCEPTABILITY OF INSPECTION TO NATO
STUDY(1) RECOMMENDS LIMITATIONS ON AERIAL INSPECTION. AN

EXTRACT FROM THE PAPER IS AT ANNEX B.
SUB PARA D. SHAPE STUDY ON AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY(2). A
COPY OF THIS PAPER IS AT ANNEX C.

3. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAS ALREADY STATED(3)
THAT A MEASURE OF AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD ASSIST GROUND
VERIFICATION AND THIS POINT HAS BEEN TAKEN UP BY THE SPC(4).

4. THE WORKING GROUP CONSIDERS THAT THE MORE
DETAILED PROBLEMS OF AERIAL INSPECTION CAN ONLY BE FINALLY
ASSESSED WHEN CONCRETE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN
CONCLUDED. IN THIS RESPECT THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE WORKING
GROUP MUST ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THEIR POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY.
HOWEVER THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE,
DRAWING FROM THE MATERIAL ALREADY AVAILABLE, TO REACH A
NUMBER OF CONCLUSIONS FROM WHICH THE NECESSARY MILITARY
AND TECHNICAL ADVICE FOR THE SPC CAN BE DRAFTED.

5. HOST OR ADVERSARY INSPECTION
SUB PARA A. THE SHAPE PAPER AT ANNEX C RECOMMENDS
ADVERSARY INSPECTION AS TECHNICALLY MORE EFFICIENT AND
LESS LIKELY TO CAUSE FRICTION. THE US PATER AT ANNEX A
STATES THAT HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE SUITABLE.
SUB PARA B. THE ACCEPTABILITY STUDY (SEE ANNEX B) STATES
THAT ONLY AIRCRAFT BELONGING TO THE COUNTRY TO BE
INSPECTED SHOULD BE USED, AT LEAST FOR VUSUAL AIRBORNE
INSPECTION. THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE FOR THIS BEING
THAT INTRUSIVE VISUAL INSP
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SUB PARA C.

HOWEVER THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVES THAT IF ONLY LESS INTRUSIVE SENSORS, SUCH AS CAMERAS OR INFRA RED, ARE USED THE ADVANTAGES OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY PROVIDING THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW NEED TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED AGAINST THE DISADVANTAGES. FOR INSTANCE, CONTRIVED UNSERVICEABILITY COULD BE USED TO FRUSTRATE VITAL INSPECTINS AND GENUINE UNSERVICEABILITY COULD BECOME SOURCES OF FRICTION. MOREOVER THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED WHEN USING AIRCRAFT FROM THE INSPECTED COUNTRY ARE CERTAINLY BIGGER THAN IF AIRCRAFT FROM THE INSPECTING COUNTRY ARE USED.

SUB PARA D.

THE WORKING GROUP CONSIDER THAT IN CASE OF AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY- IF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY LAYS DOWN THE RULES FOR FLIGHT PATHS AT A SAFE DISTANCE FROM RESTRICTED AREAS AND ISNTALLATIONS, LIMITS THE COVERAGE AND SESOLUTION OF CAMERAS AND ENSURES THAT NO OTHER RECONNAISSANCE SENSORS ARE CARRIED EXCEPT CAMERAS, PERHAPS BACKED UP BY INFRA RED,
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IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS IF THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW WERE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTING COUNTRY. IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD HOWEVER BE A REQUIREMENT FOR AN OBSERVER OF THE HOST COUNTRY ON BOARD PACT AIRCRAFT INSPECTING THE NATO PART OF THE NGA AND PRESUMABLY THE CONVERSE WOULD ALSO APPLY.

CONCLUSION

ALTHOUGH MILITARILY AND TECHNICALLY EITHER SYSTEM IS FEASIBLE AND THE EFFICIENCY OF AERIAL INSPECTION WILL MAINLY DEPEND UPON THE DETAILED AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, THERE WOULD BASICALLY BE:

- (1) AN ADVANTAGE TO US E THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY IN CASE OF AIRBORNE LOW LEVEL VISUAL INSPECTION OR RADOR INSPECTION.
- (2) AN ADVANTAGE TO US E THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW OF THE INSPECTING COUNTRY IN CASE OF AIRBORNE INSPECTION BY PHOTOGRAPHIC MEANS, IF NECESSARY BACKED UP BY INFRA RED DEVICES. IN THAT CASE THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR AN OBSERVER FROM THE INSPECTED COUNTRY.
- (3) IN ANY CASE THE INSPECTOR WOULD NECESSARILY LAY DOWN THE AREAS TO BE INSPECTED.

6. AIRCRAFT CREWS AND CONTROL

SUB PARA A. A LOW PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT E.G. PROPELLER DRIVEN, WITH A LONG FLIGHT TIME, OPERATING AT MEDIUM ALTITUDE (I.C. 4,000 FT) COULD BE USED TO CARRY OUT AERIAL INSPECTION IF THE BASIC METHOD WOULD BE NORMAL AREA PHOTOGRAPHY.

SUB PARA B. SUCH AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE RESOURCES OF SOME OF THE ALLIES AND ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT WITH A SECOND FOR BACK UP PURPOSES WOULD BE REQUIRED.

SUB PARA C. INORDER TO ALLOW FULL ALLIED PARTICIPATION
IN AERIAL INSPECTION A SYSTEM OF MIXED CREWS FORM
INTERESTED COUNTRIES IS TECHNICALLY QUITE FEASIBLE.
SUB PARA D. CO-ORDINATION OF AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD
NEED TO BE BY THE SAME NATO BODY TASKED WITH THE CONTROL
OF THE OVERALL VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION SYSTEM.
SUB PARA E. THE SOME NAOT BODY COULD CARRY OUT THE TASK
OF ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED.
THERE WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM SUCH AS THAT RAISED BY THE
USE OF NATIONALLY OBTAINED INFORMATION
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MILITARILY AND TECHNICALLY THEREFORE AERIAL INSPECTION
IS ENTIRELY FEASIBLE.

7. TYPE OF INSPECTION

SUB PARA A. SEVERAL ELECTRONIC MEANS OF INSPECTION ARE
AVAILABLE AS WELL AS NORMAL VISUAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC
INSPECTION.
SUB PARA B. NORMAL AREA PHOTOGRAPHY, IF NECESSARY BACKED
UP BY INVRA RED DEVICES, WOULD BE THE BEST MEANS TO USE
BECAUSE THIS ALLOWN THE USE OF WIRCRAFT BELONGING TO THE
INSPECTING COUNTRY. ALTHOUGH THIS KIND OF INSPECTION MIGHT
PRODUCE NO MORE INFORMATION THAN IS OBTAINABLE FROM SATELLITES
IT WOULD NORMALLY PROFUCE IT MORE QUICKLY AND READILY AND
WOULD THEREFORE BE A MORE EFFECTIVE CHECK ON MOVEMENTS
WHICH WERE SUSPECT. THE PHOTOGRAPHS COULD ALSO BE USED
TO CHALLENGE THE OTHER SIDE WHICH WOULD NOT BE THE CASE
EITH SATELLITE PRODUCED PHOUTOGRAPHS.
SUB PARA C. NORMALLY WEATHER CONDITIONS (CLEAR SKY) ARE
BETTER OVER THE EASTERN PART OF THE NGA THAN OVER THE
WESTERN PART AND THEREFORE FOVOUR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC OR
AERIAL INSPECTION BY THE ALLIES.

8. INSPECTION OPTIONS

IN THE FOLLOWING SUB-PARAGRAPHS THREE INSPECTION OPTIONS
ARE OUTLINED:

OPTION 1

SUB PARA A. AIRCRAFT- FROM THE INSPECTED COUNTRY
CREW- FROM THE INSPECTED COUNTRY
EQUIPMENT -FROM THE INSPECTED COUNTRY
INSPECTOR(S) - FROM THE INSPECTING COUNTRY.
SUB PARA B. SYSTEM. INSPECTOR(S) REQUEST(S) AIRCRAFT
AT STATED TIME FOR STATED ROUTE WITH STATED SENSORS
COUNTRY TO BE INSPECTED PROVIDES AS REQUESTED AND GIVES
INSPECTOR UNPROCESSED FILM ON L,\$8,&.
SUB PARA C. PROBLEMS. (1) MAIN PROBLEM IS WHAT SENSORS
SHOULD BE USED AND THEIR SENSITIVITY(SECURITY).

(2) POSSIBLE FRICTION IF FLIGHT

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OPTION 3

SUB PARA A. AIRCRAFT- FORM THE INSPECTING COUNTRY

CREW-FROM THE INSPECTING COUNTRY

EQUIPMENT-FROM THE INSPECTING COUNTRY

INSPECTOR(S)- FROM THE INSPECTING COUNTRY

LIAISON - FROM THE INSPECTED COUNTRY

SUB PARA B. SYSTEM. INSPECTING COUNTRY DECLARES INTENTION
OF FLYING, STATING MISSION, INVITES LIAISON AND OBTAINS
CLEARANCE.

SUB PARA C. PROBLEMS. (1) CHECKING BY OBSERVERS THAT ONLY
AUTHORISED SENSORS ARE USED (PHOTOGRAPHIC AND, IF NECESSARY,
INFRA RED DEVICES).

(2) ENSURING AIRCRAFT FOLLOWS PATH SUBMITTED.

(3) POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY. ALTHOUGH ALL THREE OPTIONS ARE
REASIBLE, ON BALANCE OPTION THREE IS THE MOST PRACTICAL
SOLUTION.

9. RESTRICTIONS ON INSPECTION

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SUB PARA A. THE RESTRICTIONS OUTLINED IN ANNEX B HAVE
ALREADY BEEN AGREED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

SUB PARA B. FOR PRESENT NEGOTIATING PURPOSES THIS
OUTLINE OF RESTECTIONS IS THOUGHT TO BE ADEQUATE, IT
WILL HOWEVER BE NECESSARY IN DUE COURSE TO DRAW UP
DETAILED RULES ON SUCH MATTERS AS:

(1) OWNERSHIP OF EQUIPMENT;

(2) NUMBER OF INSPECTORS AND TASKS;

(3) NUMBER OF FLIGHTS;

(4) FLIGHT PROGRAMMING;

(5) RESTRICTED AREAS.

NONE OF THESE MATTERS RAISE ANY INSURMOUNTABLE TECHNICAL OR MILITARY PROBLEMS.

10. RECIPROCITY

ANY AGREED SYSTEM WILL NECESSARILY BE RECIPROCAL MILITARILY AND TECHNICALLY IT IS CONSIDERED THAT NATO PROBABLY HAS MORE TO GAIN THAN HAS THE WP FROM THE INTELLIGENCE POINT OF VIEW FROM AERIAL INSPECTION. MILITARILY THEREFORE A SYSTEM WITH THE MINIMUM NECESSARY RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE TO THE ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE OF NATO.

11. CONCLUSION

SUB PARA A. MILITARILY AND TECHNICALLY ANY AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM ON THE LINES INDICATED IN THE PAPER WOULD BE FEASIBLE, BUT THE METHOD DESCRIBED UNDER OPTION THREE IS THE MOST PRACTICAL SOLUTION.

SUB PARA B. AERIAL INSPECTION AS AN ADJUNCT TO OTHER MEANS OF INSPECTION WOULD BE TO THE ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE OF NATO.

SUB PARA C. MORE DETAILED STUDIES ARE REQUIRED TO RESOLVE THE QUESTIONS LAID DOWN IN PARA 9 AND OTHER QUESTIONS OF A MORE TECHNICAL NATURE. IN THIS RESPECT THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF AERIAL INSPECTION IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE. THIS SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN THE SPC.

(1) AC/276-D(72)1

(2) SHAPE 1000.1/20-5-4/73

(3) AC/276-D(74)1

(4) ISD/61(4TH REVISE)

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